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I.

INTRODUCTION 1

In 2003, the world was shocked and horrified to hear of the
widespread killing, torture, forced displacement, and other atrocities
visited upon the people of Darfur in the Sudan by the Sudanese

1.

All information and views contained in this Comment are current as of March 2008.

647

648

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 61:2:647

Armed Forces ("SAF") and Arab Janjaweed militias. 2 The SAF and
Janjaweed allegedly were fighting organized rebel groups, 3 but instead
of targeting the rebels, they attacked civilian towns and villages based
on the rationale that the civilians supported rebel forces. 4 The United
States defined the killings as genocide 5 and pushed the United
Nations to develop a court to try and punish those who committed
these terrible crimes. 6 However, instead of creating a tribunal, similar
to those created to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes in the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in 2005 the United Nations Security Council
chose to refer the crimes committed in Darfur to the International
Criminal Court for investigation and possible prosecution. Although
the situation in Darfur was not the International Criminal Court's
first referral, it was the first initiated by the Security Council-which
meant that, for the first time, the International Criminal Court could
act with the full power of the Security Council behind it.
Three years earlier, in 2002, the International Criminal Court
("ICC") received its sixtieth ratification, empowering it to try those
accused of "the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole." 7 These "serious crimes" consist of genocide,
8
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.
Despite the appalling pervasiveness of these crimes, the ICC has
jurisdiction in only three instances: (1) if a State Party to the ICC
refers a situation 9 to the ICC Prosecutor, (2) if the Prosecutor initiates

2.
Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the InternationalCommission of Inquiry on
Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General 3 (Jan. 25, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com-inq darfur.pdf.
3.
Prosecutor v. Harun & Abd-Al-Rahman, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest
for Ahmad Harun 3 (Apr. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Harun & Abd-Al-Rahman, Warrant of Arrest for
Ahmad Harun], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/casesfICC.02.05-01-07.2-English.pdf.
4.
Office of the Prosecutor, Int'l Criminal Court, Fact Sheet on the Situation in Darfur, the
Sudan (Feb. 27, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.intllibrary/organs/otpICC-OTPFactSheet-Darfur-20070227_en.pdf.
5.
Jim VandeHei, In Break with U.N., Bush Calls Sudan Killings Genocide, WASH. POST,
June 2, 2005, at A19.
6.
Judi Aita, Darfur War Crimes Referred to InternationalCriminal Court, AMERICA.GOV,
Apr.
1,
2005,
http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2005/April
20050401122037E
Aifas0.5436823.html.
7.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5.1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183.9
(1998), available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statutelromefra.htm
[hereinafter Rome
Statute].
8. Id. However, the ICC will not have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until the
Assembly of States Parties has adopted a definition of the crime. Id. art. 5.2.
9.
"Situation" is a technical term used by the ICC to refer to the serious crimes allegedly
committed in a defined area.
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an investigation proprio motu, 10 or (3) if the Security Council refers a
situation to the Prosecutor pursuant to its authority under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter.1 1 If the Security Council does not
refer the situation to the ICC, then the ICC depends entirely on the
cooperation of states to conduct investigations and trials. Although the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court places binding
treaty obligations on all ratifying States Parties, and states may put
"peer pressure" on each other to comply with or assist the ICC, the
ICC lacks an enforcement mechanism with which to threaten States
Parties into cooperating with the ICC. A Security Council referral, on
the other hand, comes with the authority of Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter, which the ICC could use to conduct its investigations
and ultimately to enforce its decisions. The Security Council, however,
does not appear committed to using this authority. Without Chapter
VII authority behind its actions, the ICC's investigative and
enforcement powers in situations referred by the Security Council are
much weaker. Which method of bringing a situation before the ICC
will prove to be more effective? Does the substance of theoretical
Security Council power under Chapter VII enhance enforcement in
lieu of binding treaty obligations?
To act effectively, the ICC must have the ability to carry out
investigations and prosecute the accused. In particular, the ICC must
be able to conduct its investigations with minimal state interference,
gain state assistance in enforcing ICC arrest warrants, hold trials in a
timely manner, and carry out sentencing orders with the assistance of
states. Whether the ICC can accomplish these goals depends on the
amount of support (or rather, the lack of opposition) it receives from
the United States. The United States opposed the ICC's creation, and
Congress enacted legislation to prohibit American cooperation with
the ICC. 12 The United States also signed a series of bilateral treaties,
called Article 98 agreements, which prohibit signatories from referring
investigations of any members of the American military stationed in
ICC States Parties. 13 Not only does the United States' nonmembership in the ICC result in a significant loss of potential funding

10. Proprio motu means "on one's own initiative." Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.
reference.com/browse/proprio%20motu (last visited Jan. 1, 2008).
11. Rome Statute, supranote 7, art. 13.
12. See, e.g., American Servicemembers' Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-7433 (2000).
13. Id. § 7426(c). By May 2, 2005, the United States had concluded one hundred such
agreements. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Signs 100th Article 98 Agreement (May 3,
2005), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/45573.htm.
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to the ICC, 14 but the opposition of the most powerful state in the world
also undermines the ICC's legitimacy, especially if the United States
were to take actions impeding the ICC's investigations or trials.
Many U.S. objections to the ICC stem from the independent
ability of the Prosecutor and States Parties to bring situations before
the ICC, leaving open the possibility that the ICC would try American
citizens. 15 However, if in practice the State Party and Prosecutor
referral methods prove ineffective because states refuse to cooperate
in those cases, then the States Parties might consider removing these
referral methods from the ICC's jurisdiction. If this circumstance
occurred, then with only the Security Council referral mechanism left,
the United States' primary objection to the ICC would disappear and
the United States may be willing to support the ICC-perhaps even
ratifying the Rome Statute to become a State Party to the ICC.
This Comment will explore the efficacy of the ICC referral
mechanisms, focusing on the State Party and Security Council referral
methods under which the ICC has already received requests to
investigate and potentially prosecute individuals. In order to measure
the effectiveness of the ICC's referral mechanisms, this Comment will
look primarily at the current situations before the ICC. At this time,
the ICC is investigating four situations. Three situations are referrals
from States Parties: the Democratic Republic of the Congo ("DRC"),
Uganda, and the Central African Republic. The fourth is a referral
from the Security Council: Darfur in the Sudan. 16 The ICC has made
substantial progress on only one of its State Party referrals-the DRC.
Specifically, the ICC Prosecutor conducted investigations in the DRC,
issued arrest warrants, conducted pre-trial hearings, and commenced
a trial of one of the accused. In the Ugandan situation, however, the
ICC's prosecution of individuals has stagnated and none of the
individuals for whom arrest warrants have been issued has been

14. Funding for the ICC is based upon contributions from States Parties to the Rome
Statute. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 115. These contributions are calculated using the scale
of assessment adopted by the United Nations. Id. art. 117. The United States is the largest
contributor to the United Nations's budget, and so would be required to contribute a significant
amount of money to the ICC if it were to ratify the Rome Statute. Press Release, General
Assembly, Fifth Committee Approves Assessment Scale for Regular, Peacekeeping Budgets,
Texts on Common System, Pension Fund, as It Concludes Session, U.N. Doc. GA/AB/3787 (Dec.
22, 2006), availableat http://www.un.orgNews/Press/docs/2006/gaab3787.doc.htm.
15. Bureau of Political and Military Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, The International Criminal
Court, Fact Sheet (Aug. 2, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/t/pmlrls/fs/23426.htm
[hereinafter Fact Sheet] (listing the objections that the United States has to the Rome Charter);
see infra Part V.
16. For a complete record of the situations, see International Criminal Court, Situations
and Cases, http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2008).
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taken into custody. The Prosecutor opened an investigation of a third
State Party referral, by the Central African Republic, in May 2007,
and as the situation is still in the preliminary stage of investigation, it
remains too early to assess its results.
With regard to the Security Council referral, there has been
even less progress. The Prosecutor received the Sudan referral from
the Security Council almost three years ago and has investigated the
situation in Darfur since that time. However, he issued only two
arrest warrants, neither of which has produced an actual arrest. As a
result, the ICC is far from conducting trials of any alleged
perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity in
the region. Therefore, to supplement an analysis of Security Council
referrals, this Comment will reference the experiences of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY").
The ICTY is an appropriate point of reference for evaluating
the potential success of current and future Security Council referrals
to the ICC for several reasons. First, the Security Council established
the ICTY under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and
Chapter VII authority backs ICTY actions. 17 The Security Council can
use this same Chapter VII power when it refers situations to the
ICC.1 8 Second, the ICTY and ICC were created "to prosecute persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law,"1 9
and each has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, genocide, and
war crimes. 20 Their similar purposes and the role that the Security
Council can play in their affairs make the ICTY and the ICC
comparable international courts. In particular, the ICTY offers
valuable insight into the potential assistance that the Security
Council's Chapter VII authority might offer to the ICC.
Part II of this Comment gives a brief overview of the
International Criminal Court for those unfamiliar with its structure
and jurisdiction. Part III relates the background of the four
investigations currently before the International Criminal Court in
17. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, annexed to The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuantto Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808, preamble, delivered to the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/25704/Annexes (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute], available at
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-elbasic/statut/s25704.htm.
18. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 13(b).
19. ICTY Statute, supra note 17, art. 1; Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 5. The only
difference is that the ICTY's jurisdiction is limited to the territory of the former Yugoslavia,
ICTY Statute, supra note 17, art. 8, while the ICC's jurisdiction potentially extends worldwide,
Rome Statute, supra note 7, arts. 12-13.
20. ICTY Statute, supra note 17, arts. 3-5; Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 5.
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the DRC, Uganda, the Central African Republic, and the Sudan. Part
IV applies the experiences of the ICTY to Security Council referrals to
the ICC and examines whether the participation of the Security
Council will make a difference in the ICC's ability to conduct
investigations and arrest suspects. Part V discusses a key variable in
determining the ICC's success in investigating the situation in the
Sudan: the United States. More broadly, this Comment explores
whether United States support is necessary for the ICC to prosecute
cases in situations referred by the Security Council. However, this
Comment also questions whether United States involvement would
impede Security Council assistance to the ICC. If so, the potential
advantages to the ICC of having the Chapter VII power of the Security
Council could be moot.
This Comment concludes that, realistically, the Security
Council's Chapter VII authority does not make Security Council
referrals any more effective than referrals by States Parties or
investigations opened by the ICC Prosecutor. However, were the
United States to support the Security Council's referrals, the ICC
would find its powers greatly enhanced with the authority of the
Security Council behind it. The critical player behind the success of
Security Council referrals may not be so much the Security Council,
but the United States.
21
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

The International Criminal Court has four distinct organs: the
three Trial Divisions, the Presidency, the Office of the Prosecutor, and
the Registry. The ICC divides its eighteen judges among three Trial
Divisions: the Pre-Trial Chambers, the Trial Chambers, and the
Appeals Chamber. 22 Each Pre-Trial Chamber admits evidence, issues
warrants, and determines if a crime falls under the ICC's
jurisdiction. 23 The two Trial Chambers conduct trials and sentence the
convicted. 24 The Appeals Chamber hears appeals and has the power to
reverse or amend a decision or sentence or arrange for a new trial
before a different Trial Chamber. 25 One of the eighteen judges serves
as the President and two serve as Vice-Presidents. 26 These individuals
21.

For a comprehensive overview of the ICC, see JENNIFER ELSEA, INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL COURT: OVERVIEW AND SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES (2003).

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Rome Statute, supra note 7, arts. 36.1, 39.1.
Id. art. 57.
Id. art. 76.
Id. art. 83.2.
Id. art. 38.
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are responsible for administrative matters, such as assigning cases to
27
the Pre-Trial Chambers.
The Office of the Prosecutor consists of a Prosecutor, currently
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, one or more Deputy Prosecutors, and the
Prosecutor's staff.28 After receiving a referral, the Prosecutor decides if
further inquiry is necessary and, if so, opens an investigation. 29 In
30
addition, the Prosecutor can initiate investigations proprio motu.
Upon a determination that there is a "reasonable basis to proceed with
an investigation," the Prosecutor will request that the Pre-Trial
Chamber authorize commencement of an investigation. 3' Finally, the
Registry is responsible for the non-judicial administration of the
ICC.32
Although not an organ of the ICC, the Assembly of States
Parties ("ASP") plays an important role in its management. One
33
representative from each State Party to the ICC belongs to the ASP.
If a State Party fails to comply with a request made by the ICC, the
ICC can refer the matter to the ASP and the ASP determines what, if
any, action to take. 34 The Rome Statute does not specify whether the
ASP can level sanctions on States Parties. Given that the ICC has no
standing army or other forces to compel a State Party to cooperate
with the ICC, the ASP's penalties are limited to actions such as
denying that state's ASP representative a vote. In addition, the ASP
also has the power to amend the Rome Statute after the ICC has been
in force for at least seven years.3 5 Any amendment to the structure or
workings of the Court would not become effective until one year after
seven-eighths of the States Parties have ratified or accepted the
6
amendment.3
As noted above, the ICC only has jurisdiction over "the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole,"
defined as: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the
crime of aggression.3 7 The ICC has jurisdiction over individuals (1)

27. Id.
28. Id. art. 42.4.
29. Id. art. 15.2-3.
30. Id. art. 15.1.
31. Id. art. 15.3-4.
32. Id. art. 43.1.
33. Id. art. 112.1.
34. Id. arts. 87, 112.2(f).
35. Id. art. 121.1-2.
36. Id. art. 121.4.
37. Id. art. 5.1. However, the ICC will not have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
until the Assembly of States Parties has adopted a definition of the crime. Id. art. 5.2.
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who commit these crimes and are nationals of States Parties or (2)
who commit crimes in the territory of States Parties. 38 Thus, the ICC
could try an individual from a non-State Party if he or she committed
a crime in a state under the jurisdiction of the ICC.
However, a process called complementarity limits the ICC's
jurisdiction. 39 Under complementarity, if a state with jurisdiction over
a particular crime investigates an individual and decides to prosecute,
then generally that state's jurisdiction will supersede the ICC's
jurisdiction. 40 The ICC has jurisdiction only when the state appears
"unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution," or if the state's decision to refrain from prosecution
"resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to
prosecute." 4 1 As a final note, the ICC's jurisdiction extends only to
those crimes committed since July 1, 2002, when the Rome Statute
became effective and the ICC was formed.

III. THE STATUS OF THE SITUATIONS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A SLIDING SCALE OF SUCCESSES

A. The DemocraticRepublic of the Congo
The ICC's most advanced investigation to date is in the DRC.
Although the ICC only has jurisdiction over crimes committed since its
inception in 2002,42 violence in the DRC dates back to 1998, when
Rwandan- and Ugandan-backed rebels overthrew the government in
Kinshasa. 43 In an address to the Assembly of States Parties,
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo stated that numerous individuals
potentially committed genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes in the DRC. 44 In July 2003, the Prosecutor announced that he

38. Id. art. 12.2.
39. Id. art. 17.1; see id. art. 1 ("[ICC jurisdiction] shall be complementary to national
criminal jurisdictions.").
40. Id. art. 17.1.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Pascal Kambale & Anna Rotman, The International Criminal Court and Congo:
Examining the Possibilities, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, Oct. 2004, http://www.globalpolicy.
org/intljustice/icc/2004/lO4examine.htm.
44. Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr. Luis MorenoOcampo, 2, delivered to the Second Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court
(Sept.
8,
2003),
available at
http://www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/LMO-20030908_En.pdf.

2008]

SECURITY COUNCIL'S CHAPTER VII

655

would monitor the situation. 45 Shortly thereafter, in September 2003
he informed the ASP that while he was prepared to open an
investigation under his proprio motu powers if necessary, a referral
from the DRC, a State Party to the ICC, would facilitate the Office of
the Prosecutor's efforts. 46 On March 3, 2004, Joseph Kabila, the
President of the DRC, complied by referring all crimes committed in
the DRC within the ICC's jurisdiction to the ICC. 47 The Prosecutor
subsequently opened the ICC's first investigation on June 23, 2004.48
The Office of the Prosecutor currently is investigating crimes
committed by a number of armed groups in the Ituri region, one of the
most violent areas of the DRC. 49 Particularly, the Prosecutor is
focusing on the recruitment and use of child soldiers: UNICEF
estimates that 30,000 children are associated with armed groups in
the DRC,5 0 and the investigation of crimes against children led to the
Prosecutor's first arrest. On January 13, 2006, the Prosecutor applied
to Pre-Trial Chamber I (the chamber hearing pre-trial motions
concerning the DRC situation) for an arrest warrant against Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo. The warrant alleges that Lubanga Dyilo founded and
presided over the Union Patriotic Congolese ("UPC"), a rebel group in
the Ituri region, as well as the Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of
the Congo ("FPLC"), the military wing of the UPC. 51 The warrant
further alleges that due to his "de facto authority" over the UPC and
the FPLC, Lubanga Dyilo was responsible for war crimes committed
by the FPLC under Articles 8 and 25 of the Rome Statute: enlisting

45. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, Prosecutor Receives Referral of the Situation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Apr. 14, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int
/pressreleasedetails&id=19&l=en.html.
46. Id.
47. Id.; Letter from Joseph Kabila, President of the DRC, to Luis Moreno-Ocampo,
Prosecutor of the ICC (Mar. 3, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/casesfICC-01-0401-06-39-AnxBlFrench.pdf.
48. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, The Office of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court Opens Its First Investigation (June 23, 2004), available at http://www.icccpi.int/press/pressreleases/26.html.
49. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo (Mar. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Press Release on Lubanga Dyilo], available at
Lauren McCollough, International
http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease-details&id=133.html;
Criminal Court Completes First Pre-Trial Hearing, CRIMES OF WAR PROJECT, Nov. 29, 2006,
http://www.crimesofwar.org/onnews/Lubanga.html.
50. Press Release on Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 49.
51. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Warrant of Arrest 3 (Feb. 10,
2006) [hereinafter Lubanga Dyilo, Warrant of Arrest], available at http://www.icccpi.int/library/cases/ICC-01-04-01-06-2_tEnglish.pdf.
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and conscripting children under the age of fifteen and using these
52
children to participate in hostilities.
At the time of the arrest warrant request, the DRC was holding
Lubanga Dyilo in custody on suspicion of being involved in the killing
of United Nations peacekeepers. 53 Nevertheless, the Office of the
Prosecutor pushed for Pre-Trial Chamber I to issue an immediate
warrant. 54 The Prosecutor stressed the urgency of the situation,
stating that the political situation in the DRC was unstable and that
the election of a new president in the spring of 2006 could affect the
willingness and ability of DRC authorities to comply with an arrest
warrant. 55 The Pre-Trial Chamber subsequently issued the warrant on
February 10, 2006.56 The ICC Registry informed DRC authorities of
the Pre-Trial Chamber's decisions on March 14, and the DRC
cooperated with the ICC by promptly sending Lubanga Dyilo to The
Hague in a French military aircraft. 57 United Nations peacekeeping
forces in the DRC 58 provided further support. 59 In addition, Pre-Trial
Chamber I requested the cooperation of all States Parties "to identify,
trace, freeze or seize the property and assets of Mr. Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo" that could be used to pay reparations to crime victims. 60 PreTrial Chamber I made this request pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1596, in which the Security Council exercised its Chapter
VII authority to announce that all states "shall" freeze the assets of
61
persons designated by the Security Council Sanctions Committee.
62
The Committee listed Lubanga Dyilo as one of these persons.

52. Id. at 3-4. Article 8 gives the ICC jurisdiction over war crimes. Rome Statute, supra
note 7, art. 8. Article 25.3(a) states that an individual is criminally responsible if that person
commits a crime within the ICC's jurisdiction. Id. art. 25.3(a).
53. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Prosecutor's Submission of
Further Information and Materials 3-4 (Jan. 25, 2006), available at http://www.icccpi.int/library/cases/ICC-01-04-01-06-32-AnxB English.pdf.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 3.
56. Lubanga Dyilo, Warrant of Arrest, supra note 51, at 5.
57. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, First Arrest for the International Criminal Court
(Mar. 17, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressreleasedetails&id=132.html.
58. The United Nations forces comprised part of the United Nations Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo ('MONUC"). Id.
59. Id.
60. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Request to States Parties to the
Rome Statute for the Identification, Tracing and Freezing or Seizure of the Property and Assets
of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 2 (Mar. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Lubanga Dyilo, Request to States
Parties], available at http://www.icc-cpi.intllibrary/caseslICC-01-04-01-06-62-tEnglish.pdf.
61. Id. at 3; S.C. Res. 1596, 15, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1596 (Apr. 18, 2005).
62. Lubanga Dyilo, Request to States Parties, supra note 60, at 3-4; List of Individuals and
Entities Subject to the Measures Imposed by Paragraphs 13 and 15 of Security Council
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On January 29, 2007, Pre-Trial Chamber I determined that
there is "sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe
that Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is responsible, as a co-perpetrator, for the
charges of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen
years into the FLPC and using them to participate actively in
hostilities" from September 2002 to August 2003.63 His trial will begin
on March 31, 2008.64 Thus, Lubanga Dyilo will be the first person
tried by the International Criminal Court.
Pre-Trial Chamber I also issued warrants of arrest for two
other individuals. In July 2007, the ICC issued a warrant for Germain
Katanga, formerly the highest-ranking commander of the Patriotic
Resistance Force in Ituri ("FRPI").65 The Court found reasonable
grounds to believe that the FRPI and others attacked the village of
Bogoro in the Ituri region in February 2003, murdering, harming, and
imprisoning civilians, pillaging the village, committing sexual
enslavement of women and girls, and using children under age fifteen
to participate in the attack. 66 Furthermore, the Court found
reasonable grounds to believe that Katanga, by designing the plan to
attack and ordering its execution, was essential to its implementation
and responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes. 67 In
March 2005, DRC authorities arrested Katanga in relation to an
attack against MONUC peacekeepers in Ituri on February 25, 2005.68
Thus, the DRC promptly executed the arrest warrant and surrendered
Katanga to the ICC on October 18, 2007.69
Near the same time, Pre-Trial Chamber I also issued a warrant
of arrest for Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, an alleged former leader of the

Resolution 1596 (2005), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/DRC/1533_list.htm
(last updated Feb. 6, 2007).
63. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01104-01106, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges 156-57 (Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/casesICC-01-04-01-06803-tEN English.pdf.
64. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Regarding the Timing
and Manner of Disclosure and the Date of Trial 15 (Nov. 9, 2007), available at http://www.icccpi.intflibrary/cases/ICC-01-04-01-06-1019-ENG.pdf.
65. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for Germain
Katanga 3, 5 (July 2, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-01-04-01-071_tEnglish.pdf.
66. Id. at 4.
67. Id. at 5-6.
68. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Background Information Sheet 1-2
(Oct. 18, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/casesICC-01-04-01.07-BckInfoENG.pdf.
69. Id. at 1.
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National Integrationist Front ("FNI"). 70 The Court found reasonable
grounds to believe that Ngudjolo Chui was "essential" to the
implementation of the attack on Bogoro described above and was
71
responsible for committing crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Congolese authorities arrested Ngudjolo Chui on February 6, 2008
72
and immediately transferred him to the ICC.
Successful completion of the ICC's first trial would enhance the
ICC's credibility significantly, as would the continued issuance and
prompt execution of arrest warrants for individuals allegedly involved
in crimes committed in the DRC. The DRC's commitment to the ICC
was tested when the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Ngudjolo Chui,
who was not in the custody of the DRC, and the Congolese authorities'
prompt execution of the warrant demonstrates the DRC's continued
willingness to support the ICC. Future cooperation with the ICC will
strengthen the Court's effectiveness, while lackluster efforts will
prevent the ICC from progressing further with its mission to bring
criminals to justice. Because this case remains the first test of the ICC
in action, the situation in the DRC will play a leading role in
demonstrating whether the ICC can effectively investigate and
prosecute individuals without the aid of the Security Council. The
success of the ICC under these circumstances will depend upon real
commitment and cooperation from the involved States Parties.
B. Uganda
The Prosecutor's office received its first referral from the
government of Uganda. 73 The Lord's Resistance Army ("LRA"), a
splinter group of rebel forces from the former Ugandan People's
Democratic Army, has attacked civilians in northern Ugandan since
Yoweri Musveni became President of the country in 1986. 74 On

70. Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/07, Warrant of Arrest for Mathieu
Ngudjolo Chui 3, 5, 7 (July 6, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-01-0402-07-1-tENG.pdf.
71. Id. at 5-6.
72. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, Third Detainee for the International Criminal
Court: Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Updated) (Feb. 7, 2008), available at http://www.icccpi.int/press/pressreleases/329.html.
73. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning
the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC (Jan. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Press Release,
President of Uganda Refers Situation], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease
_details&id=16&l=en.html.
74. Background Information on the Situation in Uganda 1 (Jan. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/caseslUGD/s0204/sO204_b.html
(under "29.01.2004
Background
information on the situation in Uganda," select "English").
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December 16, 2003, Museveni referred all crimes of the LRA to the
ICC, requesting that the Prosecutor open an investigation.75 The LRA
committed a series of human rights abuses against civilians in
Uganda, including summary executions, torture, mutilation, rape, and
forced displacement.7 6 To accomplish these crimes, the LRA abducted
over 20,000 children and forced them to engage in a host of violent and
inhuman acts, including ritual killings and mutilations. 77 In 2000,
Uganda adopted an Amnesty Act granting amnesty to any person who
engaged in armed rebellion against the Ugandan government since
1986 if that person "renounce[d] and abandon[ed] involvement in the
war or armed rebellion;"7 8 however, the Ugandan government later
withdrew this offer as it applied to any top LRA leaders subsequently
79
indicted by the ICC Prosecutor.
The Prosecutor opened an investigation in Uganda on July 29,
2004,80 and interpreted the Ugandan government's referral as
applying to all crimes committed in Uganda, not just those of the
LRA.8 1 This broad interpretation opened the door for ICC
investigation and potential indictment of members of the Ugandan
government in addition to LRA affiliates.8 2 Almost a year later, on
July 8, 2005, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC issued five warrants,
previously filed by the Prosecutor, for the arrest of the following senior
commanders of the LRA for committing war crimes and crimes against
humanity: Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Raska Lukwiya, Okot
Odhiambo, and Dominic Ongwen.8 3 Pre-Trial Chamber II also issued
requests that warrants for the arrest and surrender of the five
commanders be transmitted to the DRC and the Sudan as well as
Uganda,8 4 because the LRA has additional bases in these states and

75. Press Release, President of Uganda Refers Situation, supra note 73.
76. Background Information on the Situation in Uganda, supra note 74.
77. Id.
4 (2000) (Uganda), available at http://www.c78. The Amnesty Act, 2000, Part II,
r.org/our-work/accord/northern-uganda/documents/2000_Jan_TheAmnesty.Act.doc.
79. Akhavan Payam, The Lord's Resistance Army Case: Uganda's Submission of the First
State Referral to the InternationalCriminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 403, 410 (2005).
80. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, Decision to Open Investigation (July 29, 2004),
available at http://www.icc.cpi.int/pressreleasedetails&id=33&l=en.html.
81. Office of the Prosecutor, Int'l Criminal Court, Statement by the Chief Prosecutor on the
http://www.iccavailable at
(Oct.
14,
2005),
Warrants
2
Arrest
Uganda
cpi.intflibrary/organs/otp/speeches/LMO_20051014_English.pdf.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 3-6.
84. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision on the Prosecutor's Urgent
Application Dated 26 September 2005, at 5 (Sept. 27, 2005), available at http://www.icccpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-04-01-05-27_English.pdf.
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the indicted individuals move between them.8 5 Sudan, although not a
State Party to the ICC, signed an ad hoc agreement with the Office of
the Prosecutor pledging to surrender any indicted LRA leaders.8 6 The
Prosecutor highlighted the importance of these three states working
87
together to carry out the arrests.
Of the three countries, Uganda has made the most significant
effort thus far to capture the five fugitives. The Ugandan government
communicated with the governments of the DRC and the Sudan, as
well as with MONUC and the United Nations peacekeeping forces in
the Sudan ("UNMIS"), to coordinate actions against the LRA.88 The
Ugandan government formed a regional security group focused on
disarming the LRA, executing the ICC's arrest warrants, and
facilitating a dialogue between the Ugandan government and the LRA
to reach a peaceful resolution to conflict. 8 9 In addition, the Ugandan
government entered into negotiations with the LRA. 90 These
negotiations led to the two parties signing a Cessation of Hostilities
Agreement for a temporary cease-fire in parts of southern Sudan. 91
Although it is too soon to predict an outcome, the Ugandan
government emphasizes "the positive effect that the warrants have
had in motivating the LRA to attend peace talks," which could
92
positively impact stability in the region.
Despite Uganda's efforts, the subjects of the warrants either
remain at large or have been killed. The Ugandan government93
confirmed that Raska Lukwiya was killed in combat in August 2006,
and Vincent Otti reportedly has been killed under orders of Joseph
Kony in October 2007. 94 The ICC terminated proceedings against
Raska Luwiya, but is awaiting confirmation of Vincent Otti's death
85. Office of the Prosecutor, Uganda Arrest Warrants, supra note 81, at 7.
86. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Submission of Information on the Status
of the Execution of Warrants of Arrest in the Situation in Uganda 16 (Oct. 6, 2006) [hereinafter
http://www.iccavailable at
Warrants],
on
of Information
Submission
Kony,
cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-04-01-05-116 English.pdf.
87. Office of the Prosecutor, Uganda Arrest Warrants, supra note 81, at 7.
88. Kony, Submission of Information on Warrants, supra note 86, at 11. The formal title of
UNMIS is the United Nations Mission in Sudan.
89. Press Release, Security Council, Uganda's Foreign, Defence Ministers Brief Security
Council, Call for Strong Measures to Disarm Lord's Resistance Army, U.N. Doc. SC/8695 (Apr.
19, 2006), availableat http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8695.doc.htm.
90. Kony, Submission of Information on Warrants, supra note 86, at 3.
91. Id. at 14.
92. Id. at 3.
93. Id. at 6-7.
94. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Submission of Information Regarding
Vincent Otti 2 (Nov. 8, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.intllibrary/cases/ICC-02-04-01-05258_English.pdf.

2008]

SECURITY COUNCIL'S CHAPTER VII

before ending proceedings against him. 95 Progress regarding the other
three subjects has slowed or stalled. While the Office of the Prosecutor
stated that it "does not possess information that would cast doubt as
to the genuine nature of any State's willingness to cooperate in
executing the warrants of arrest,"96 only Uganda responded to the
Prosecutor's request for an update on the status of warrant execution
in those three states. 97 Neither the DRC nor the Sudanese government
responded. 98
Although no state has requested that the ICC withdraw the
warrants, actions by the Sudanese government indicate that it would
favor a withdrawal. Before beginning peace talks with members of the
LRA in June 2006 (including with Joseph Kony, whom the Sudanese
government did not arrest at the talks), Salva Kiir, the President of
Southern Sudan, said that efforts to arrest LRA leaders had been
unsuccessful. 99 Instead, he said that Sudan "opted for the peaceful
solution," and "[if] we fail to convince them with logic to come back,
then we can resort to implement[ing] the ICC order." 100 It would
appear, then, that the Sudanese government is not engaged in
executing the ICC arrest warrants. Additionally, Uganda has mixed
views about the outstanding warrants: although Ugandan officials
report that they told Kony in November 2006 that the indicted
individuals "should not expect that the warrants of arrest [will] be
withdrawn," 10 1 the Ugandan government also has said that it will
"consider" dropping the ICC's charges against Joseph Kony if he

surrenders. 102
The international community also has made only modest
efforts to execute the LRA arrest warrants. Interpol promulgated the
ICC warrants globally via "red notices." 10 3 In March 2006, the Security
95. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision to Terminate the Proceedings
Against Raska Lukwiga 2, 4 (July 11, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.intlibrary/casesfICC02-04-01-05-248_English.pdf.
96. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Submission of Additional Information on
the Status of the Execution of the Warrants of Arrest in the Situation in Uganda 8 (Dec. 18,
2006) [hereinafter Kony, Submission of Additional Information on Warrants], available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-04-01-05-132-English.pdf.
97. Kony, Submission of Information on Warrants, supra note 86, at 5.
98. Id.
99. Southern Sudan Seeks Peace with LRA, INDEP. ONLINE, June 9, 2006,
http://www.int.iol.co.za/index.php (search for "Southern Sudan Seeks Peace with LRA"; select
article).
100. Id.
101. Kony, Submission of Additional Information on Warrants, supra note 96, at 5.
102. Jeffrey Gettleman, UN Envoy Meets with UgandanRebel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, at
A3.
103. Kony, Submission of Information on Warrants, supranote 86, at 6.
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Council adopted Resolution 1663, encouraging UNMIS "to make full
use of its current mandate and capabilities" against the LRA and
Sudanese communities.1 0 4 The Security Council also requested
recommendations as to how the United Nations, and "in particular
10 5
UNMIS, could more effectively address the problem of the LRA."'
However, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted that
UNMIS and MONUC "already have challenging tasks to perform in
their respective areas of responsibility" and "should channel their
10 6
capacities and resources primarily to address those challenges."'
Although "UNMIS and MONUC can provide assistance," dealing with
"the regional implications of LRA activities lies within the area of
national responsibility of the Governments in the region.' 0 7
Effectively, the Secretary-General has given the UN peacekeeping
forces an "out" from executing the arrest warrants. Prosecutor Luis
Moreno-Ocampo reported in late 2006 that while his office has
received reports of "good faith-efforts to execute the warrants of
arrest, . .
operational and coordination challenges remain
significant," and that MONUC made ensuring the safe conduct of the
DRC's first democratic presidential elections in forty years its top
priority.10 8 However, the presidential elections were completed in late
2006, and since that time MONUC has not made any efforts that have
resulted in the capture of any of the remaining alleged criminals.
The longer the three remaining fugitives remain at large, the
less effective the efforts of Uganda and the international community
to arrest and try these individuals will prove to be. The Ugandan
government also may determine that it is more advantageous to drop
the ICC charges against the LRA leaders in exchange for a lasting
peace agreement. Although dropping charges would mean that the
ICC would not bring these alleged criminals to justice, this outcome
should not be equated with failure. The efforts of the Prosecutor and
the ICC play a crucial role in compelling parties to conduct
meaningful negotiations, as well as reducing crime and violence-the
very acts that the ICC is intended to deter.

104. S.C. Res. 1663, 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1663 (Mar. 24, 2006).
105. Id. 8.
106. The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Resolutions 1653
(2006) and 1663 (2006), 51, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/478 (June 29,
2006),
available
at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO6/415/40/PDF/
N0641540.pdfOpenElement.
107. Id. $ 52.
108. Kony, Submission of Additional Information on Warrants, supranote 96, at 10.
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C. The CentralAfrican Republic

The government of the Central African Republic sent a letter of
intent to the ICC Prosecutor on December 22, 2004, referring to the
ICC any crimes within its jurisdiction committed in the territory of
the Central African Republic. 10 9 At the end of 2002 and in the
beginning of 2003, a large number of civilians were killed and raped in
connection with armed conflict between the government of the Central
African Republic and rebel forces after a failed coup attempt. 110 Unlike
the other situations before the ICC, a majority of the crimes in the
Central African Republic involve sexual violence: in just five months,
the Office of the Prosecutor identified over six hundred victims.1 1 ' In
April 2006, the Court de Cassation, the highest court of the Central
African Republic, confirmed that the national judicial system would be
unable to carry out criminal proceedings to investigate, arrest, and
prosecute the individuals who committed the crimes." 2 Therefore, the
ICC has unambiguous jurisdiction over the perpetrators of those
crimes.
Few conclusions can be drawn from the ICC's involvement in
the Central African Republic at this time. The Prosecutor has said
that his office's investigation will focus on crimes committed from
2002 and 2003 and that he will monitor allegations of any crimes
committed since the end of 2005.113 At the time of writing, the Office of
the Prosecutor's investigation was not aimed at any particular
suspect. 114 Because the investigation is only in its preliminary stages,
the Office of the Prosecutor has not yet released any detailed
information about its progress.

109. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, Prosecutor Receives Referral Concerning Central
African
Republic
(Jan. 7,
2005),
available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease
_details&id=87&l=en.html; Office of the Prosecutor, Int'l Criminal Court, Background
Information on the Situation in the Central African Republic 1 (May 22, 2007), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/press/pressreleases/ICC-OTP-BN-20070522-220 A EN.pdf.
110. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, Prosecutor Opens Investigation in the Central
African Republic
(May 22,
2007),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressreleasedetails&id=248&l=en.html; Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 109.
111. Office of the Prosecutor, Background Information on the Situation in the Central
African Republic, supranote 109, at 2.
112. Id. at 3.
113. Id. at 1-2.
114. Id. at 4.
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D. The Sudan
On March 31, 2005, the Security Council, acting under its
Chapter VII powers, referred the violent atrocities committed in
Darfur to the ICC.115 In Resolution 1593, the Security Council ordered
that "the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict of
Darfur shall cooperate fully" with the ICC and the Prosecutor. 116
Furthermore, the Security Council urged all non-States Parties to
cooperate fully, even though they do not have any obligation to do so
under the Rome Statute.1 1 7 The Resolution also invited the Prosecutor
to address the Security Council three months after opening an
investigation and every six months thereafter to keep the Council
informed of the ICC's progress.1 18 However, the Resolution expressly
stated that none of the ICC's expenses would be borne by the United
Nations,'1 9 even though Article 115 of the Rome Statute encourages
the United Nations to provide funds, "in particular in relation to the
1 20
expenses incurred due to referrals by the Security Council."
Security Council Resolution 1593 was written with great care
in order to avoid a U.S. veto of the referral provision. The United
States abstained from the Security Council's vote and opted "not to
oppose the resolution because of the need for the international
community to work together in order to end the climate of impunity in
the Sudan, and because the resolution provided protection from
investigation or prosecution for U.S. nationals and members of the
armed forces of non-State[s] parties." 121 Anne Woods Patterson, the
U.S. representative to the Security Council, stated that the stipulation
providing that United Nations funding would not be given to the ICC
was "extremely important" and that "[a]ny effort to retrench on that
principle by the United Nations or other organizations to which the
United States contributed could result in [the United States]
withholding funding or taking other action in response." 122 Despite its
115. S.C. Res. 1593, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
116. Id. 2 (emphasis added).
117. Id.

118. Id.

8.

119. Id. 7.
120. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 115(b).
121. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to
Prosecutor of Int'l Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm; see S.C. Res. 1593, supra note 115, 6
(stating that any nationals or officials from contributing states that are Non-States Parties to the
Rome Statute are subject to that state's exclusive jurisdiction, unless expressly waived by the
contributing state).
122. Press Release, Security Council, supra note 121.
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unwillingness to finance the ICC, Patterson declared that the United
States "would be an important contributor to the peacekeeping and
123
related humanitarian efforts in the Sudan."
The Prosecutor decided to open an investigation in Darfur on
June 6, 2005.124 In his initial statement, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo
stressed the importance of "sustained cooperation from national and
international authorities" to complement efforts by the African Union
and others to end the violence in Darfur. 125 In this regard, assistance
from the Sudanese government is of particular importance to the
conduct of the investigation. However, the Sudanese government has
a mixed record on cooperation. In May 2006, the Sudanese
government provided information to the Office of the Prosecutor about
the Sudanese legal system and the parties to the conflict in Darfur. 126
The staff of the Office of the Prosecutor also met with Sudanese
government officials and obtained a limited number of documents
about the events in the Sudan.127 Nevertheless, a considerable number
of requests for documents and interviews made by the Office of the
Prosecutor remain outstanding. 128 More recently, it appears that the
Sudanese government has backtracked from its initial decision to
cooperate with the ICC. In February 2007, the Sudanese Minister of
State of Foreign Affairs advised the Prosecutor that because its
officials were investigating the situation in Darfur, "they could not
allow another investigation to take place on [Darfur's] territory."129
The Sudanese government further entrenched its position in April
2007, by posting on the official website of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Sudan a document stating that the government had "no
intention" of cooperating with the ICC.13° Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo
told the Security Council in December 2007 that the "degree of

123. Id.
124. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, The Prosecutor of the ICC Opens Investigation in
Darfur
(June
6,
2005),
available
at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressreleasedetails&
id=107&l=en.html.
125. Id.
126. The Prosecutor, Statement of the Prosecutorof the International Criminal Court, Mr.
Luis Moreno-Ocampo to the UN Security Council Pursuantto UNSCR 1593 (2005), 1-2, delivered
to the Security Council (Dec. 14, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.intlibrary/organs
/otp/LMO_20061214_en.pdf.
127. Id. at 5.
128. Id. at 6.
129. The Prosecutor, Fifth Report of the Prosecutorof the InternationalCriminal Court to the
UN Security Council Pursuantto UNSCR 1593 (2005), 10, delivered to the Security Council (June
6, 2007) [hereinafter Fifth Report], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp
/OTPReportUNSC5-DarfurEnglish.pdf.
130. Id. at 11.
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cooperation" previously provided by the Government of the Sudan "no
31
longer exists."'
The Prosecutor has addressed the Security Council several
times concerning the development of his Office's investigation.
Although the Office of the Prosecutor has made "good progress" in
collecting information about the range of crimes committed in
Darfur,' 3 2 continuing violence is hampering the Prosecutor's
investigative efforts. 133 Thus, the bulk of the Prosecutor's investigation
has taken place outside of the country, 134 although the Office of the
Prosecutor has managed to conduct five missions to the Sudan and
35
speak with government officials.
Despite these drawbacks, the Prosecutor announced to the
Security Council in December 2006 that his Office had gathered
evidence of both crimes against humanity and war crimes in the
Darfur region. 136 On May 1, 2007, the ICC issued arrest warrants for
two individuals, Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb. Ahmad Harun was
the Minister of State for the Interior of the Government of Sudan, and
Pre-Trial Chamber 1 found reasonable grounds to believe that he
coordinated the SAF and Janjaweed responses to the rebel
insurgencies, including attacks on villages.' 37 Ali Kushayb was a
senior tribe leader and member of the Popular Defense Force and
commanded thousands of Janjaweed from August 2003 to March
2004.138 Pre-Trial Chamber 1 found reasonable grounds to believe that

131. The Prosecutor, Sixth Report of the Prosecutorof the InternationalCriminal Court to the
UN Security Council Pursuantto UNSCR 1593 (2005), 4, delivered to the Security Council (Dec.
5, 2007) [hereinafter Sixth Report], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTPRP-20071205-UNSC-ENG.pdf.
132. The Prosecutor, Second Report of the Prosecutorof the International Criminal Court,
Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, to the Security Council Pursuant to UNSC 1593 (2005), 1, delivered to
the Security Council (Dec. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Second Report], available at http://www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/LMOUNSCReportBEn.pdf.
133. The Prosecutor, Third Report of the Prosecutor of the InternationalCriminal Court to
the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 1, delivered to the Security Council
(June 14, 2006),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/OTPReportUNSC_3DarfurEnglish.pdf ('CThe continuing insecurity in Darfur is prohibitive of effective investigations
inside Darfur . .
134. Id.
135. Office of the Prosecutor, Fact Sheet on the Situation in Darfur, supra note 4.
136. The Prosecutor, Fourth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,
Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 1,
delivered to the Security Council (Dec. 14, 2006),
available at http://www.icccpi.intllibrary/organs/otp/OTPReportUNSC4-DarfurEnglish.pdf.
137. Harun & Abd-Al-Rahman, Warrant of Arrest for Ahmad Harun, supra note 3, at 5.
138. Prosecutor v. Harun & Abd-Al-Rahman, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest
for Ali Kushayb 5 (May 1, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-05-0107-3_English.pdf.
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Ali Kushayb implemented a counter-insurgency strategy resulting in
the commission of crimes against humanity and war crimes and that
he personally participated in some of the acts. 139 Both men's warrants
charge them with committing war crimes and crimes against
140
humanity.
Yet, despite the fact that the whereabouts of each of these
individuals in the Sudan is widely known, the Sudanese government
has not turned either of them over to the ICC. Ahmad Harun is
serving as the Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs, a position
he has held since 2006 in the current government of Sudan. 141 And Ali
Kushayb, although previously reported to be in the custody of the
Sudanese Police pursuant to a Sudanese warrant of arrest for
different crimes, 142 now has been "released for lack of evidence" and is
"moving about freely in the Sudan." 143 The Security Council has not
acted to enforce the arrest warrants or lend any assistance to the ICC
to bring these two individuals before the ICC.
The Security Council's work to bring peace and security to the
region by deploying UN military personnel continues, but its efforts
have yet to be successful. In August 2006, the Security Council passed
Resolution 1706 in recognition of the continuing violence in Darfur.1 44
The Council ordered the deployment of additional military personnel
to the region to establish security, protect victims, and facilitate the
work of UN personnel in Darfur. 45 However, UN military personnel
mandates are not directed specifically towards aiding the ICC in
investigating the situation and bringing potential criminals to justice,
and Resolution 1706 does not provide for the protection of ICC
witnesses.1 46 The Prosecutor has stressed the necessity of protecting
139. Id.
140. Prosecutor v. Harun & Abd-Al-Rhaman, Case No. ICC-02105-01/07, Request to the
Republic of the Sudan for the Arrest and Surrender of Ahmad Harun 3 (June 4, 2007)
[hereinafter Harun & Abd-Al-Rhaman, Arrest and Surrender of Ahmad Harun], available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-05-01-07-13-tENEnglish.pdf; Prosecutor v. Harun &
Abd-Al-Rhaman, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Request to the Republic of the Sudan for the Arrest
and Surrender of Ali Kushayb 3 (June 4, 2007), available at http://www.icccpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-05-01-07-14-tEN_- English.pdf.
141. Harun & Abd-Al-Rhaman, Arrest and Surrender of Ahmad Harun, supra note 140.
142. Fifth Report, supra note 129, at 7 (citing a letter from the Sudanese Ministry of Justice
to the Office of the Prosecutor dated December 9, 2006).
143. Sixth Report, supra note 131, at 1, 3.
144. S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006).
145. Id.
1, 3, 9(a), 10, 12(a).
146. Situation in Darfur, Sudan, ICC-02/05-16, Prosecutor's Response to Cassese's
Observations on Issues Concerning the Protection of Victims and the Preservation of Evidence in
the Proceedings on Darfur Pending before the ICC 7 (Sept. 11, 2006), available at http://www.icccpi.int/library/casesfICC-02-05-16_English.pdf.
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witnesses: "The establishment of an effective system for the protection
of ICC victims and witnesses is a precondition to the conduct of
investigative activities in Darfur."'147 Due to the extreme violence in
the region, the ICC may not be able to ensure the protection of
witnesses or victims. It appears that until Darfur and the surrounding
region are more stable, or the Security Council or another
international organization takes it upon itself to protect victims and
ICC witnesses, the Prosecutor's investigation will be restricted to
gathering evidence and interviewing witnesses and victims primarily
outside of Darfur. These restraints limit the scope of the investigation
considerably.
IV. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ICTY's EXPERIENCES TO THE ICC

The ICTY's experience in investigating and prosecuting
individuals with the possibility of Security Council assistance is
helpful in evaluating the potential of Security Council aid to the ICC.
In comparison to the ICC, which has existed for only five years and at
the time of this writing is about to begin its first fledgling trial, the
ICTY has been a fully functioning court for more than ten years and
has conducted numerous trials. As an international court established
by the Security Council, the ICTY provides a good example of how the
Security Council, as well as states, may be expected to act after the
Security Council refers a situation to the ICC pursuant to its Chapter
VII authority. This Part begins by describing the extent of the
Security Council's powers under the United Nations Charter. It then
discusses the role that the Security Council has played in ICTY
proceedings and the effect that the Security Council's initiatives have
had on countries legally bound to obey its orders. This Part concludes
with an analysis of what the ICTY's proceedings foreshadow for ICC
Security Council referrals. Specifically, it analyzes whether referrals
by the Security Council will, in actuality, result in state cooperation
with the ICC's investigations and arrests, as compared to referrals
brought by States Parties or the Prosecutor.
A. The Power of the Security Council
Under Article 24 of the United Nations Charter ("UN
Charter"), the Security Council has primary responsibility for
maintaining international peace and stability. 148 Specifically, the
147. Second Report, supra note 132, at 4.
148. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1.
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Security Council "shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace... and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
149
restore international peace and security."
The Security Council's Chapter VII enforcement powers
encompass actions that either involve or do not involve the use of
armed forces. Article 41 contains a non-exhaustive list of measures the
Security Council may take that do not involve the use of armed forces,
such as suspending economic and diplomatic relations.' 50 If the
Security Council deems that such non-military actions are or will be
inadequate, then it can take military action to maintain or restore
international peace and security.' 5 1 All United Nations members are
obligated to carry out decisions made by the Security Council, 152 and
these obligations prevail over any conflicting provisions in other
international agreements. 153 Thus, Security Council resolutions made
under its Chapter VII authority "are binding as law and mandatory as
policy, so long as the operative paragraphs indicate a direct
1 54
imperative."'
B. The Implementation of Security Council Power in the ICTY
The Security Council has been "most creative" in fashioning
appropriate responses to threats to the peace under Article 41,155 and
it is under this Article that it established the ICTY to prosecute those
persons "responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia."'156 The Security Council ordered "all States shall
cooperate fully with the International Tribunal" and are obligated to
comply with orders or requests for assistance made by Trial Chambers
of the ICTY. 157 Article 29 of the Statute of the ICTY confirms this
commitment and specifically says that states "shall" cooperate with
149. Id. art. 39.
150. Id. art. 41.
151. Id. art. 42.
152. Id. art. 25.
153. Id. art. 103.
154. Christopher C. Joyner, Strengthening Enforcement of HumanitarianLaw: Reflections on
the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 79,
88 (1995).
155. Faiza Patel King, Sensible Scrutiny: The Yugoslavia Tribunal's Development of Limits
on the Security Council's Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 509,
521 (1996).
156. S.C. Res. 827, 2, U.N. Doc. SJRES/827 (May 25, 1993).
157. Id.

4.
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the ICTY, for example, by arresting persons or transferring accused to
the ICTY. 158 Therefore, orders by the Trial Chambers "shall be
considered to be the application of an enforcement measure under
159
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations."'
If a state does not cooperate with an order of the Trial
Chamber, then the ICTY can appeal to the Security Council. For
example, when issuing a warrant of arrest, the Registrar of the ICTY
may submit a copy of the arrest warrant to the national authorities of
the state in which the accused is believed to be located. 160 A state must
report to the Registrar why it is unable to make the arrest; otherwise,
the ICTY will deem the state's inaction a failure to execute the
warrant. 16 1 In such a scenario, the Prosecutor of the ICTY can notify
62
the Security Council of the state's failure to arrest the individual:
the "implication ... is that any responsive or punitive action taken
against the delinquent government will be decided upon and imposed
by the Security Council acting as the Tribunal's enforcement agent."' 63
But in practice, the Security Council has failed to take any practical
action when the ICTY has appealed to it for assistance. In 1996, for
example, ICTY President Antonio Cassese informed the Security
Council on two separate occasions that the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia ("FRY") had failed to execute warrants. 164 The Security
Council's only response was to issue statements "deploring" the FRY's
165
failure to act.
The Security Council further provided for enforcement of the
ICTY's directives when it empowered states to establish a

158. ICTY Statute, supranote 17, art. 29.
159. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph2 of
Security Council Resolution 808 (1993),
126, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (May 3, 1993).
160. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since
1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 55(D), U.N. Doc. IT/32 (Feb. 11, 1994).
161. Id. at R. 59.
162. The ICTY's applicable rule states:
If the Prosecutor satisfies the Trial Chamber that the failure to effect personal service
was due in whole or in part to a failure or refusal of a State to cooperate with the
Tribunal in accordance with Article 29 of the Statute, the Trial Chamber shall so
certify. After consulting the Presiding Judges of the Chambers, the President shall
notify the Security Council thereof in such manner as the President thinks fit.
Id. at R. 61(E).
163. Joyner, supra note 154, at 93.
164. Jelena Pejic, The Tribunal and the ICC: Do Precedents Matter?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 841, 850
(1997).
165. Id. (quoting Qin Huasun, Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc.
S[PRST/23 (May 8, 1996)).
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multinational Implementation Force ("IFOR") in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. 166 NATO founded IFOR to implement the military
aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement ("DPA"). 167 The DPA does not
give explicit instructions to IFOR about cooperating with the ICTY or,
in particular, apprehending indictees. However, the DPA does order
its signatories to comply with the ICTY 168 and authorizes IFOR "to
take such action as required, including the use of necessary force, to
ensure compliance" with the DPA. 169 Consistent with this approval,
the DPA has granted IFOR the authority "to use military force to
search for and arrest persons indicted by the International
1 70
Tribunal."
Despite this mandate, IFOR contributed minimally to the
ICTY's efforts to bring criminals of the Former Yugoslavia to justice.
Some viewed the Security Council-imposed obligation to search for
and arrest criminals for the ICTY as solely a "state obligation" that
did not apply to IFOR forces. 17 ' Under this rationale, "it is perfectly
proper for states or NATO to decide that IFOR will not be assigned the
mission to search for and arrest indicted war criminals so long as
states take action to give effect to their obligation." 172 NATO officers
argued "they will arrest such men [indicted persons] only if they are
noticed by their soldiers in the course of their normal duties and if the
soldiers feel that the circumstances permit."' 73 As a result, IFOR
troops did not seek out and arrest even the most accessible of indicted
war criminals. 74 After several years, a few states' divisions of IFOR
(including the U.S. division) did adopt a "case-by-case approach" and

166. S.C. Res. 1031,
14-15, U.N. Doe. S/RES/1031 (Nov. 30, 1995).
167. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 1A:
Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement, art. 1, T 1(a), U.N. Doc. S/1995/999
(Dec. 14, 1995).
168. Id. art. 9, 1(g).
169. Id. art. 1, 2(b); Pejic, supra note 164, at 851; see Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., International
Obligations to Search for and Arrest War Criminals: Government Failure in the Former
Yugoslavia?, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 411, 443-45 (1997) (giving an overview of the DPA and
IFOR's powers under the agreement).
170. Sharp, supra note 169, at 445.
171. Id. at 445-46 (citing John T. Burton, "War Crimes" During Military Operations Other
than War: Military Doctrine and Law 50 Years after Nuremburg and Beyond, 149 MIL. L. REV.
199, 203-04 (1995)).
172. Id. at 446.
173. Stacy Sullivan, Bosnia's Most Wanted Mostly Accessible; War Crimes Suspects Maintain
High Profile in Croat-Run Town, but Police Pay No Mind, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 1996, at A21.
174. See id. (giving examples of several high-profile Bosnian business owners who were
indicted but never arrested).
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arrest a small number of indicted war criminals. 175 In fact, it was the
"military, diplomatic, and financial might" of the United States, and
not the Chapter VII authority behind the ICTY Charter, that
eventually led to former Serbian and Yugoslav President Slobodan
176
Milosevic's arrest and transfer to the ICTY.
Yet, even though the ICTY does not enjoy the full force of the
Security Council's Chapter VII powers, it has conducted numerous
trials and brought many criminals to justice. As of July 2006, the
ICTY had concluded proceedings against ninety-six of 161 charged
indictees. 177 According to the ICTY, only six fugitives remain at
large. 178 This success is due largely to states' increased cooperation
with the ICTY, especially within the region of the former
Yugoslavia. 79 Former Yugoslavian states began to arrest indictees
after the international community increased diplomatic pressure. 8 0 In
addition, other states, such as Austria and Germany, arrested
indictees that surfaced in their territories and transferred them to the
ICTY. l8 1 The Prosecutor of the ICTY also made several arrests with
the help of UN forces in Croatia and the NATO Stabilization Force in
1 82
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
It is impossible to determine to what extent states cooperated
because of the Chapter VII authority placed behind the ICTY by the
Security Council. From the plain language of the Charter, it would
appear that the grant of Chapter VII authority would have some
impact on state conduct. However, the Security Council's lack of
definitive and forceful action in support of the ICTY when states failed
to cooperate with the ICTY may indicate that Security Council threats
neither deter states from noncompliance nor cause them to cooperate
175. Michael P. Scharf, The Tools for Enforcing InternationalCriminal Justice in the New
Millennium: Lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 925, 959-64 (2000).
176. Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating InternationalCriminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89,
93 (2003) (citations omitted). The United States threatened to withhold from the successor
regime in Yugoslavia half a billion dollars of US and IMF aid. Id.
177. President of the Int'l Tribunal, Report of the InternationalTribunal for the Prosecution
of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, 4, U.N. Doc. A/61/271-S/2006/666 (Aug. 21,
2006), available at http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/2006/AR06.pdf.
178. Id. 75.
179. See id.
75-86 (detailing the cooperation of states that have assisted the ICTY). Still,
not all states have supported the ICTY. The President of the ICTY has reported that Serbia does
not consistently or expeditiously cooperate with the ICTY, even though all six of the remaining
fugitives have ties to Serbia. Id. 1 79.
180. Sean D. Murphy, Progressand Jurisprudenceof the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor
the Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 59-60 (1999).
181. Id. at 59, 64-65.
182. Id. at 60.
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with the ICTY. This lack of practical support from the Security
Council makes the ICTY's achievements all the more remarkable.
C. Lessons from the ICTY as Applied to the ICC
The key factor that could render Security Council referrals to
the ICC more effective than State Party or Prosecutor referrals is the
power of the Security Council. However, at least in the case of the
ICTY, the Security Council has been unwilling to take any definitive
action to enforce its directives. This reluctance could have a
detrimental impact on any Security Council referrals to the ICC,
including the ICC's investigation in Darfur.
Under its Chapter VII authority, the Security Council has the
theoretical power to compel states to cooperate with the ICC's
investigation in Darfur and to take repercussive actions against those
states that do not cooperate. However, there is no precedent for the
Security Council taking this kind of action. When the President of the
ICTY referred instances of state noncompliance to the Security
Council, the Security Council issued weak remonstrances to those
states and failed to take further action. 8 3 In the case of Darfur, it is
unlikely that the Security Council would admonish a non-compliant
state, given the United States' lukewarm stance regarding the
Security Council's referral. Because it is opposed to the ICC in
general, the United States could stymie any attempt by the Security
Council to enforce arrest warrants issued by the ICC, or even any
effort to issue a statement condemning a state's unwillingness to
cooperate with the ICC. And if the Security Council did invoke its
Chapter VII authority to issue a statement, there is no guarantee that
this condemnation would cause a state to begin cooperating with the
ICC. Thus, the Security Council's Chapter VII theoretical authority is,
in practice, ineffective if it is not backed up by a legitimate threat of
repercussion.
Furthermore, even if the Security Council has deployed United
Nations military forces to a particular area to promote peace and
stabilization, it does not follow that those forces will be given a
mandate to cooperate with the ICC or, if such a mandate did exist,
that those forces would expend any significant effort to arrest ICC
suspects or otherwise help the ICC Prosecutor with his investigations.
For example, although IFOR had the authority to search for and
arrest suspects indicted by the ICTY, NATO forces did not
immediately take the initiative to enforce arrest warrants or actively
183. See supratext accompanying notes 164-165.
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search for indictees. Even when NATO forces began to search for and
arrest ICTY indictees, these arrests were carried out by NATO forces
from select countries only, instead of reflecting a far-reaching effort
184
embarked upon by the whole of IFOR.
Given that NATO and IFOR interpreted their Security Council
and DPA authority narrowly to avoid responsibility for searching for
and arresting indictees, the Security Council should be more explicit
in its directives. The Security Council could invoke its Chapter VII
authority to order forces to cooperate with and assist an international
court in any way possible. This potential approach should be
contrasted with the situation in the Sudan, where the Security
Council did not give United Nations forces deployed to Darfur
instructions to search for future ICC indictees or to aid the ICC
Prosecutor with his investigation.18 5 In a number of important aspects,
the reluctance of the Security Council to use its Chapter VII powers to
back its Darfur referral places the referral on the same footing as the
State Party referral investigations in the DRC and Uganda. In the
investigation of the Darfur situation, the ICC must rely exclusively on
the willingness of States Parties to comply with their international
treaty obligations and on the goodwill of non-States Parties to lend
assistance, without the additional help that the Security Council could
provide (such as forcing States Parties and non-States Parties alike to
cooperate with the ICC). With no real threat of penalty, States Parties
inclined to be uncooperative have little incentive to lend support to the
ICC.
Nevertheless, the fact that the Security Council chooses not to
help the ICC does not mean that the ICC will be unable to complete its
investigations, arrest indictees, hold trials, or bring criminals to
justice. The ICTY has managed to try and convict many indictees
without the full weight of the Security Council's Chapter VII powers
behind it. The ICC itself has had some initial success without any help
from the Security Council. In the DRC situation, Pre-Trial Chamber I
recognized the instability of the DRC government and quickly issued
an arrest warrant in order to bring Lubanga Dyilo into ICC custody.
States Parties to the ICC also have assisted the ICC with its
investigations: the DRC cooperated with the ICC by turning over
Lubanga Dyilo, Katanga, and Ngudjolo Chui to the ICC, and France
provided a military escort for Lubanga Dyilo. 8 6 The Prosecutor wisely
issued his first warrant against an individual already in the custody of
184. See supra text accompanying notes 166-176.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 144-146.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57, 69, 72.
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a State Party willing to cooperate with the ICC. Instead of drawing
world attention to a potentially drawn-out search that might not
culminate in an arrest, and giving States Parties the opportunity to
renege on their treaty commitments, the Prosecutor kept the focus on
an ICC that was fulfilling its mandate of bringing the criminals who
committed the most serious crimes to justice. The efficient completion
of the ICC's first trial will only add to the ICC's credibility as a
functioning and effective international court.
Although the ICC shows promise, it faces difficulties as well.
Despite the issuance of multiple arrest warrants in the Uganda
situation, no state has arrested a single indicted person and turned
him over to the ICC to date. Uganda and the Sudan also have
indicated their reluctance to hand the indicted over to the ICC for fear
that it could jeopardize the peace process in Uganda.1 8 7 Because the
ICC has no standing force of its own, there is little the ICC can do to
compel states to cooperate with and aid its investigations. Similarly,
the ICC has issued arrest warrants related to its investigation in
Darfur, and no state has acted to execute the warrants.18 8 The
Security Council could use its Chapter VII authority to adopt a
resolution ordering states to assist the ICC. The Security Council also
could take action under Article 41 of the UN Charter to punish states
refusing to cooperate with the ICC by, for example, severing
diplomatic relations or imposing limited economic sanctions. Such
action could be particularly useful against states where the indictees
are known to be residing. But the Security Council has yet to take
such an action, and as the ICTY's experiences demonstrate, the
Security Council is unlikely to do so in the near future. Undoubtedly,
the ICC would be better equipped if its actions had the threat of
Security Council enforcement behind them. The ultimate question
then becomes how to change the approach of the Security Council from
a policy of merely referring situations to the ICC and taking no
further action, to a strategy of putting real Chapter VII authority
behind its referrals and compelling states to assist with the ICC's
investigations.

187. See supra text accompanying notes 99-102.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 141-143.
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V. THE UNITED STATES: THE FORCE BEHIND THE
SECURITY COUNCIL'S ACTIONS

When 120 countries adopted the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court on July 17, 1998,189 one vital state's vote
was missing: the United States. 190 Although the ICC can, and is,
functioning without the support of the United States, the United
States is a powerful member of the Security Council. As a result, it
can impede any real efforts by the Security Council to give effective
assistance to the ICC.
U.S. influence over the Security Council in matters relating to
the ICC is evident in examining the Darfur situation. Likely the only
reason the United States abstained instead of vetoing the referral1 91
was the grave situation in Darfur and the political ramifications
should the United States have worked against an effort to bring the
perpetrators of such violent crimes to justice. Still, the absence of any
mention of the ICC in Security Council Resolution 1706, which
deployed United Nations personnel to Darfur, 192 was undoubtedly at
least in part due to the United States' reluctance to assist the ICC in

any way. As evinced by the events leading up to the transfer of
Slobodan Milosevic to the ICTY, U.S. military and financial resources
can be a powerful force behind Security Council resolutions designed
to bring criminals to justice. 193 Thus, the most effective way to
increase the Security Council's exercise of Chapter VII authority to
the benefit of the ICC would be to obtain U.S. support of the ICC.
The ICC could wait and hope that future U.S. administrations
will view the ICC in a more favorable light. While the current Bush
administration opposes joining the ICC, a Democratic administration
could decide to sign the Rome Statute and submit the treaty to the

Senate for ratification. However, even Democrats have expressed a
number of concerns about the current design of the ICC. President
Clinton signed the Rome Statute on December 31, 2000, but declared
that the treaty had "significant flaws," and until the international

189. Alessandra Stanley, US Dissents, but Accord is Reached on War-Crime Court, N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 1998, at A3.
190. Goldsmith, supra note 176, at 100 (" 'The choice was to do what we did and hope that
the U.S. will someday, decide to join,' or ... to 'so undermine the court that it makes an eventual
American buy-in not worth it.' Here, 'undermine the court' means establish a court with effective
immunity for the United States." (quoting Lloyd Axworthy, the Foreign Minister of Canada, in
Stanley, supra note 189)); Fact Sheet, supra note 15.
191. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 144-146.
193. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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community fixed those problems, he would not submit the treaty to
the Senate for ratification. 194 On May 6, 2002, President Bush
rescinded President Clinton's signature of the treaty, stating that the
United States did not intend to ratify the Rome Statute. 195 In light of
U.S. actions, the ICC cannot rely on the U.S. government eventually
changing its mind. Instead, the ICC must consider changes it could
make to its structure and jurisdiction in order to gain the United
States', and thus the Security Council's, full backing and support and
whether these changes would unfairly bias the ICC in favor of the
United States.
The United States' most serious concern regarding the ICC is
the possibility that American citizens (primarily, American soldiers)

could be brought before

it.196

As stated previously, the ICC has

jurisdiction over individuals who are nationals of States Parties and
individuals who commit crimes in the territory of States Parties. 97 So
if an American allegedly committed a crime in the territory of a State
Party, or in the territory of a non-State Party that accepted the
jurisdiction of the ICC, then the ICC could bring that person before it.
The Rome Statute provides an escape clause through the
complementarity process. 9 8 But the United States has reservations
about the ICC making the determination of whether a state is able to
carry out the investigation or prosecution impartially'9 9 and fears that
a decision of the ICC could be influenced by outside political forces
instead of a thorough review of a state's judicial system.
There are several possible ways that the Rome Statute could be
amended to address the objections of the United States. For instance,
the jurisdiction of the ICC could be limited to nationals of states who
have ratified the Rome Statute. 200 The drawback to this approach is
that states whose nationals have committed serious crimes simply
could elect not to ratify the Rome Statute, or withdraw from the ICC,
to avoid ICC jurisdiction. This approach would be particularly
194. Statement on the Rome Treaty on the International Criminal Court, 37 WKLY.
COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Dec. 31, 2000, at 4.

195. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, International Criminal Court: Letter to UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan (May 6, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm.
196. Fact Sheet, supra note 15.
197. See supra text accompanying note 38.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
199. Fact Sheet, supra note 15.
200. Of course, if the United States joined the ICC, then U.S. citizens would be within ICC
jurisdiction once more. But limiting the ICC's jurisdiction to nationals of States Parties could be
effective in obtaining U.S. support of the ICC through more powerful Security Council
resolutions.
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troublesome in the case of states whose governments are controlled by
perpetrators of serious crimes. Another option would be to let the
Security Council decide whether a state sufficiently investigated an
individual and made a reasonable decision regarding whether to
prosecute that individual. The United States then always would be
able to veto any decision that the investigation into and prosecution of
an American citizen was insufficient. But this option also has an
important drawback: the United States and the veto-holding members
of the Security Council would in effect be able to immunize themselves
from ICC jurisdiction. This alternative also would detract from the
credibility of the ICC itself in the eyes of non-Security Council
member states and could undermine the Court's legitimacy.
Along similar lines, the U.S. government believes that the
Prosecutor should not have the ability to initiate investigations with
his proprio motu powers. Because the Prosecutor cannot be held
accountable by the Security Council or an elected body, but only by the
ICC itself, the U.S. Department of State argues that the ICC "lacks
fundamental checks and balances." 20 1 This again reflects the fear of
the United States that American citizens could be brought before the
ICC for political reasons, even if their actions had already been
investigated and tried before U.S. courts. To address this concern, the
ICC could take away the proprio motu powers of the Prosecutor and
limit the ICC's jurisdiction to referrals by States Parties and the
Security Council, or even just the Security Council. At the Rome
Conference, the United States maintained that, similar to the ICTY
and ICTR ad hoc tribunals, ICC prosecutions should be limited to
those referred by the Security Council. 202 However, other delegates
argued "a Security Council gatekeeper would preclude legitimate
203 if
prosecutions and thus undermine the aim of universal justice,"
the Security Council were led to make its decisions for purely political
reasons instead of basing its decisions on the merits of the cases.
Furthermore, the veto power of the five permanent members of the
Security Council would make them "and their close allies immune
from prosecution." 204 For these reasons, the founders of the ICC
established three separate methods of bringing cases to the ICC.
Another way that the ICC could be changed to appease the
United States would be to modify the Security Council's power to
delay an ICC investigation or prosecution by the ICC. Currently, the

201. Id.
202. Goldsmith, supra note 176, at 90.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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Security Council can vote to delay an investigation or prosecution for
twelve months and renew that resolution indefinitely, 205 but if one
permanent member vetoes the delay, the investigation or prosecution
can continue. 20 6 However, the Rome Statute could be amended to
reverse this process: instead of voting to delay an investigation or
prosecution, the Security Council instead could be required from time
to time to vote to support the ICC continuing an investigation. Under
this approach, a permanent member of the Security Council could use
its veto power to prevent the Security Council from supporting the
continuation of an investigation, which would then delay it. This
option would enable the United States (or any other Security Council
member) to protect its citizens by vetoing any resolution directed
towards continuing an investigation or prosecution. It also would
address U.S. concerns both about the ICC's power to determine
whether a state was unwilling or unable to prosecute an individual
and about the Prosecutor's lack of accountability. But again, the
United States and other permanent members of the Security Council
could vote to immunize themselves from the ICC's jurisdiction, which
weakens the ICC's "aim of universal justice." 20 7 Knowledge that
investigations require recurring Security Council reapproval also
could have a negative impact on the conduct of the investigations
themselves.
In any event, if the ICC made these radical changes to its
structure and jurisdiction, there is no guarantee that the United
States would reverse its position and support the ICC and thus back,
and perhaps even initiate, Security Council resolutions to enforce ICC
decisions and requests for assistance. However, given that the United
States was a strong supporter of the creation of an international
criminal court and was a major player in the negotiations through the
Rome Conference in 1998,208 it is likely that the United States would
look upon a modified ICC with favor.
VI. CONCLUSION

Under the current structure of the ICC and in the current
political climate, Security Council referrals to the ICC have no more
enforcement behind them than State Party referrals or investigations
initiated by the ICC Prosecutor, even though the Security Council

205.
206.
207.
208.

Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 16.
Goldsmith, supra note 176, at 90-91.
Id. at 90.
ELSEA, supra note 21, at 2-3 (internal citations omitted).
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theoretically can back up its referrals with Chapter VII authority.
This is the case because the Security Council has not chosen to
exercise its Chapter VII powers outside of the referral itself. However,
the ICC could choose to modify its structure and jurisdiction in the
hope of gaining the support of the United States. If the United States
reversed its position on the ICC, then the United States could
influence the Security Council to issue more effective resolutions that
would raise the chances of states assisting the ICC in its
investigations and enforcing ICC arrest warrants. The ICC has to
make a choice. If it elects to stay the course, the potential effectiveness
of the Court is constrained. However, if the ICC decides to
significantly change its structure in response to U.S. objections, then
its mandate to punish "the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community" could be limited to punishing only those
''most serious" crimes committed by individuals outside of the
permanent five members of the Security Council. 20 9 This puts the ICC
in a difficult position in its developing years.
Any effort to amend the Rome Statute would take years, and in
any event no State Party can propose an amendment to the ICC until

July 31,

2009.210

In the intervening period, it will be interesting to

monitor the progress of the current investigations and prosecutions. If
the Ugandan rebels are captured in the near future, and the
government of the Sudan decides to hand over Ahmad Harun and Ali
Kushayb, then perhaps the Chapter VII authority of the Security
Council will not be necessary to the ICC's success. If investigations
and prosecutions continue to stall because no arrest warrants are
executed, and the ICC has no one to try in two of its investigations,
then the ICC should debate what modifications it could make to bring
the United States on board, and as a consequence, what sacrifices it is
willing to make to its own legitimacy.
Elizabeth C. Minogue*

209. Rome Statute, supra note 7, at preamble.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
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